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NOTES AND COMMENTS
LIMITATIONS ON CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO DEPORT
RESIDENT ALIENS EXCLUDABLE AS PSYCHOPATHS
AT TIME OF ENTRY*
THE McCarran Immigration Act's provision for the deportation of aliens
who were excludable at time of entry as "persons afflicted with psychopathic
personality"' permits administrative expulsions under an indefinite standard
to which the courts have added scant precision. As a result, unpredictable
and largely uncontrolled deportations effecting "delayed exclusion" may occur
at the order of immigration hearing officers.2 While treating expulsion as an
*United States ex rel. Leon v. Murff, 250 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1957), a~ffrining United
States ex rel. Leon v. Shaughnessy, 143 F. Supp. 270 (S.DN.Y. 1956).
1. "Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the following classes of aliens shall
be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the United States:
... Aliens afflicted with psychopathic personality . . . ." Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walters Act) § 212(a), 66 Stat. 182, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1952)
[hereinafter cited as "Act of 1952"]. "Any alien in the United States . . .shall, upon the
order of the Attorney General, be deported who-() at the time of entry was within
one or more of the classes of aliens excludable by the law existing at the time of such
entry." Act of 1952, § 241(a), 66 Stat. 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1952).
The Act of 1952 is analyzed in Developn ntis in the La--Inoigration and Nation-
ality, 66 HARv. L. REv. 643 (1953); AUERBACH, IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES (1955). The President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization evalu-
ated the policies and effects of the 1952 act in WHOM WE SHALL WELcoME (1953)
[hereinafter cited as WHom WE SHALL WELcOME]. For a collection of case studies
under the 1952 act, see LOWENsmiN, THE Auax AND THE IMMIGRATIOl LAw (1958).
For a critical study of American immigration law in broad perspective, see Immigration,
21. LAw & CoNTzMP. PROB. 211-426 (1956).
2. A special inquiry officer shall conduct proceedings under this section to determine
the deportability of any alien, and shall administer oaths, present and receive evi-
dence, interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien or witnesses, and, as au-
thorized by the Attorney General, shall make determinations, including orders of
deportation.
Act of 1952, § 242(b), 66 Stat. 209, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1952).
For a detailed and critical presentation of the procedural steps leading to deportation,
with emphasis on the role of the special inquiry officer, see Note, 42 VA. L. Rv. .803
(1956). Deportation procedures are described and criticized in WHOM WE SHALL WEL-
comE 152-67.
In the fiscal year 1956-1957, 326,867 aliens were admitted into the United States for per-
manent residence. 1957 IUMIGPAIxON & NATvRALIZATION SERVIcE ANN. REP. 17. In the
same year, 59 aliens were deported for mental or physical defects in a total of 5,082
deportations; in 1956, 80 out of 7,297; in 1940, 362 out of 6,954; in 1930, 1,042 out of
16,631. Id. at 52. "In evaluating these figures it must be borne in mind that many aliens
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exercise of the generally unreviewable power of Congress over foreign rela-
tions,3 courts acknowledge that deportation proceedings constitute govern-
mental action within the territorial boundaries of the United States and are,
therefore, not exempt from constitutional requirements.4 In deference to the
immigration policies of Congress, the judiciary has compromised these re-
quirements by imposing due process standards on deportation procedures 6
found deportable are permitted to depart voluntarily:' AuERBACH, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 294. In 1957, 63,379 aliens departed "voluntarily" after having been found deportable
(65% across the southwestern border). 1957 IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERvICE
ANN. REP. 14. A survey of case studies reports that: "In spite of this comparatively
small number of actual deportations the danger of becoming deportable on the charge
of mental illness or its concomitant, becoming a public charge, creates concern among
newly arrived aliens." LowRNlsrmi-, op. cit. supra note 1, at 235.
3. [T]he power to exclude or to expel aliens, being a power affecting international
relations, is vested in the political departments . . . except so far as the judicial
department has been authorized . . . or is required by the paramount law of the
Constitution to intervene.
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893).
[A]ny policy toward aliens [including deportation] is vitally and intricately in-
terwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign re-
lations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government.
Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government
as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952).
4. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) ("[O]nce an alien lawfully enters
and resides in this country he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the Con-
stitution to all people within our borders."); Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86,
101 (1903) (due process requires hearing if alien "has entered the country, and has be-
come subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its population, although
alleged to be illegally here") ; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
The Civil Rights Act, Rr-v. STAT. § 1977 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1952), provides
that: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, . . . and to
the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens .... "
5. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49 (1950); Japanese Immigrant
Case, 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903); cf. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 184-86 (1948)
(dissenting opinion). See generally Boudoin, The Settler Within Our Gates (pts. 1-3),
26 N.Y.U.L. REv. 266, 451, 634 (1951.) ; Note, Constitutional Restraints on the Expulsion
and Exclusion of Aliens, 37 MINN. L. R1v. 440 (1953).
Procedural due process has been narrowly defined in deportation cases. See, e.g.,
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280 (1955) (publication of At-
torney General's belief that alien was deportable held not basis for attributing bias to
Board of Immigration Appeals under his supervision); Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225
U.S. 460, 470 (1912) (preliminary interrogation without presence of counsel and denial
of process to compel testimony permitted) ; United 'States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S.
131, 134 (1924) ("mere error, even if it consists in finding an essential fact without
adequate supporting evidence, is not a denial of due process") ; WHOM WE SHALL WE.-
comE 162 (deportation procedure "fails to conform to the now generally accepted stand-
ards for fair hearings"). See generally Note, Deportation and Due Process, 5 STAN. L.
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but not on statutory grounds for expulsion. 6 The courts have rejected the
suggestion, however, that immigration officials enjoy discretion beyond that
granted by statute 7 -even if, as members of the executive branch, they par-
take of presidential power in foreign affairs. 8 This limitation, coupled with
the dictates of procedural due process, indicates that deportation orders will
not be sustained unless supported by statutory authority and sufficient evi-
dence.9 Although no McCarran Act decisions involving the delayed exclusion
REv. 722 (1953) ; Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law: Proposals for Reform, 56
COLUm. L. REv. 309 (1956).
Doubt exists as to the applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat.
237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001-11 (1952). Compare Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S.
180 (1956), with Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955). See generally Note, Our
Immigration Laws, A Continuing Affront to the Administrative Procedure Act, 41 GEO.
L.J. 364 (1953).
Crucial to the degree of judicial protection available in deportation proceedings is a
determination of the point at which entering aliens acquire the right to a modicum of
procedural due process. Under present international law, the territorial boundaries of
the United States lie at least three miles off shore. BRIGGs, TH1E LAw OF NATIONs 281-
84, 372-85 (2d ed. 1952). But in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892),
the Court upheld a statutory provision which preserved "entrant" status during a would-
be immigrant's detention ashore pending determination of admissibility. The Act of 1952
contains a similar provision. § 233(a), 66 Stat. 197, 8 U.S.C. § 1223(a) (1952). The
provision was recently upheld in its most extreme application when a returning resident
alien was denied readmission, denied a hearing, and detained indefinitely on United States
soil because he could not gain entrance to any other country. Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). Those conditionally admitted to the country
can also be deported without due process. Rogers v. Quan, 357 U.S. 193 (1958) ; Leng
May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958). Contra, United States ex rel. Paktorovics v.
Murff, 260 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1958).
6. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) ("what classes of aliens shall
be allowed to stay are for Congress exclusively to determine," id. at 597 (concurring
opinion)); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1954). But see Bridges v. Wixon,
326 U.S. 135, 162 (1945) (concurring opinion) ("[T]he First Amendment and other
portions of the Bill of Rights make no exception in favor of deportation laws enacted
pursuant to a 'plenary' power.").
7. See Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3, 9 (.1915) ("The statute by enumerating the con-
ditions upon which the allowance to land may be denied, prohibits the denial in other
cases.") ; Karayannis v. Brownell, 251 F.2d 882 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; United States ex rel.
Duner v. Curran, 10 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1925); VAN VLECK, THE AmnNIsTRArvm CON-
TROL OF ALiENs 153-57 (1932); Note, 52 COLUm. L. REv. 1060, 1061 (1952).
8. In one case the Court attributed to the executive a nonstatutory power to exclude
entering aliens. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1.950)
("When Congress prescribes a procedure concerning the admissibility of aliens .. .it is
implementing an inherent executive power.").
9. On the sufficiency of evidence, see Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 156 (1945);
United States ex ref. Jim Leong v. O'Rourke, 125 F. Supp. 769 (W.D. Mo. 1954);
United States ex ref. Chen Ping Zee v. Shaughnessy, 107 F. Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1952);
Sang Ryup Park v. Barber, 107 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Cal. 1952); Note, 5 STAN. L. REv.
722, 739-40 (1953). But see United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131 (1924);
Note, 56 CoLUM. L. REv. 551, 566 (.1956) (sufficient evidence not normally regarded as
a requirement of due process). The Act of 1952 provides that "no decision of deport-
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of "persons afflicted with psychopathic personality" have been reported, cases
arising under a virtually identical provision of the Immigration Act of 1917 10
suggest that judicial review will be of no avail to aliens protesting their de-
layed exclusion as psychopaths.
ability shall be valid unless it is based upon reasonable, substantial, and probative evi-
dence." § 242(b) (4), 66 Stat. 210, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (4) (1952). This has been held
to equal the standard required by the Administrative Procedure Act § 7(c), 60 Stat.
241 (1946), 5 U:S.C. § 1006(c) (1952). Cartellone v. Lehmann, 255 F.2d 101 (6th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 867 (1958).
Judicial review has generally been predicated upon a distinction between fact and
law. The interpretation of statutory language is a judicial prerogative, see cases cited
note 7 supra, but weighing the evidence is exclusively the function of executive officials,
Lum Mon Sing v. United States, 124 F.2d 21, 23 (9th Cir. 1941). But see Ex parte
Lee Bock Fook, 40 F. Supp. 937, 940 (S.D. Cal. 1941) (court weighed and rejected
Government's expert testimony). That the distinction between law and fact is elusive is
well illustrated in United States ex tel. Duner v. Curran, 10 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1925)
("The record is destitute of the slightest evidence justifying such a conclusion . . . . It
is impossible that the statute meant to exclude all such children."), and in United States
ex rel. Fink v. Tod, 1 F.2d 246, 257-58 (2d Cir. 1924) ("Unless it appears that a proper
hearing was denied, the merits . . . are not open for our consideration . . . . Feeble-
mindedness is a question of fact."), rev'd on Governwent's confession of error, 267 U.S.
571 (1925). For a discussion of judicial review for sufficiency of evidence in deportation
cases, see Note, 56 COLum. L. REv. 551 (1956).
Common-law rules of evidence need not be applied in immigration proceedings. United
States ex rel. Smith v. Curran, 12 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1926).
10. "[T]he following classes of aliens shall be excluded from admission into the
United States: . . . persons of constitutional psychopathic inferiority . . . ." Immigration
Act of 191.7, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 875. "[A]t any time within five "years after entry, any
alien who at the time of entry was a member of one or more of the classes excluded by
law ... shall ... be ... deported." Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 889.
Both sections were repealed by the Act of 1952, § 403 (a) (13), 66 Stat. 279, 8 U.S.C.
§§ 136, 155 (1952).
The old and new versions of the "psychopath" clause are treated as equivalent in
United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1956). But see id. at 412
(concurring opinion) ("psychopathic personality" must have a different meaning from
"constitutional psychopathic inferiority," or the word "constitutional" would have been
superfluous in the 1917 act). Current Public Health Service instructions use the terms
"constitutional psychopathic inferiority" and "psychopathic personality" interchangeably.
U.S. Public Health Service, Manual for Medical Examination of Aliens II-1--6 (1950;
letter correction dated Dec. 19, 1952).
The language of the exclusion clause was altered in 1952 because "the chief difficulties
in the administration of the exclusion clauses of the 1917 Act pertaining to mentally and
physically defective aliens arise in diagnosing 'constitutional psychopathic inferiority.'"
S. RE'. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 343 (1950). The 1950 committee also took a dif-
ferent view of the purpose of the clause. The legislative history of the 1917 act indicates
that "the real object of excluding the mentally defective [including presumably, the con-
stitutional psychopathic inferior] is to prevent the introduction into the country of strains
of mental defect that may continue and multiply through succeeding generations .... "
S. REP. No. 352, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1916). The 1950 committee felt that "the ex-
clusion of persons with 'constitutional psychopathic inferiority' was aimed at keeping out
of the country aliens with a propensity to mental aberration, those with an inherent like-
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Effective judicial review has been frustrated because the delayed exclusion
of mental defectives poses unusually difficult evidentiary problems. The in-
accessibility of overseas evidence and practical limits on examinations con-
ducted when aliens enter the country necessitate findings of preadmission
mental condition based entirely on retrospective diagnosis.'1 In the first re-
ported case concerning the delayed exclusion of an allegedly psychopathic
alien under the 1917 act, the administrative decision was supported by a post-
entry psychiatric examination but not by any direct proof of disability at time
of entry.12 Reviewing a petition for habeas corpus, the court found the evi-
dence insufficient and held that the inference as to psychopathic condition at
lihood of becoming mental cases, as indicated by their case history." S. REP. No. 1515,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 343 (1950). This is apparently the congressionally conceived pur-
pose of the present provision, since the only reason for modifying the terminology was
to make enforcement "more definite and practicable." Id. at 344. The 1950 committee did
not indicate why it disagreed with its predecessor, but the difference in approach prob-
ably stems from a change in psychiatric theory. Most modern psychiatrists attribute
psychopathic personality to environmental factors, whereas many earlier authorities as-
sumed that the illness was either hereditary or acquired at birth. CLECELEY, THE MAsK
OF SANITY 28-30 (3d ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited as CLECKIE.] ; Guttmacher, Diagnosis
and Etiology of Psychopathic Personalities as Perceived in. Our Time, in CuRRENT PROB-
LEMS IN PsYcarnAic DIAGNOSIS 139, 142, 146 (Hoch & Zubin ed. 1.953).
Despite changing theories of the condition's cause, its delineation by medical authori-
ties remains substantially if not exactly the same-both terms refer to a lifelong pattern
of behavior in conflict with social norms but without accompanying guilt or anxiety.
See text at notes 34, 35 infra; Clwcti~my 29.
See generally Curran & Mallinson, Psychopathic Personality, 90 J. MENTAL ScI. 266
(1944).
11. Entering aliens may but are not required to be thoroughly examined when they
apply abroad for visas, and again upon arrival in the United States. Act of 1952, §§
221(d), 232, 66 Stat. 192, 196, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1201(d), 1222 (1.952). And "psychopathic
personality" is often difficult to diagnose except after extensive psychiatric examination.
Note 28 infra. Thorough mental examination of each entering alien would presumably
be unfeasible.
The statute does not authorize deportation for postentry mental illness unless the alien
is hospitalized at public expense. See Act of 1952, § 241(a) (3), 66 Stat. 204, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a) (3) (1952). Hence, in the absence of such hospitalization, diagnosis does not
relate to the time of examination but must relate back by inference to the time of entry.
The validity of such an inference has been disputed in cases of delayed exclusion for
physical as well as mental illness. See Ex parte Wong Nung, 30 F.2d 766 (9th Cir.
1929) (retrospective diagnosis of leprosy contested but upheld). The difficulties of retro-
spective diagnosis are set forth in VAN VL.cx, op. cit. supra note 7, at 87-88; Kane,
The Challenge of the Wickersham Deportations Report, 23 J. Am. INST. CRIM. L. & C.
575, 593 (1932). To avoid administrative difficulties, the Immigration Service recom-
mended the deportation of all aliens hospitalized for mental illness within 10 years after
entry, but Congress did not respond. See S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 343-44
(1950). Potential difficulties with retrospective diagnosis are increased by the absence of
a statute of limitations on deportation for previous excludability. See statute cited note
1 supra. The analogous provision of the Immigration Act of 1917 did not permit delayed
exclusion more than five years after entry. Statute cited note 10 supra.
12. United States ex rel. Brugnoli v. Tad, 300 Fed. 918 (2d Cir. 1924).
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entry was untenable without "some previous history."' 3 But this case was
later overruled in United States ex rel. Powlowec v. Day, in which the court
upheld a deportation order based solely upon a diagnosis of postentry de-
rangement.14 Interpreting the 1917 act's criterion-"constitutional psycho-
pathic inferiority'US--as a mental instability "inherent in [the] nervous struc-
ture," the court reasoned that, if the inference of prior illness was scientifically
tenable, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the hearing officer's order."
Conflicting expert testimony had been introduced on this point, but the court
declined to question the administrator's choice of medical theory: "[W]e
must accept the opinion of those formally qualified. . . .The whole subject
is one of excessive uncertainty at best; whoever is fitted for the responsibility,
it is certain that we are not .... "1
13. Id. at 920. The opinion went on to say, however, that if some previous history
had been shown, its sufficiency would not have been reviewed by the court even if the
experts disagreed. Ibid. See note 17 infra.
14. 33 F.2d 267, 268 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 594 (1929).
A Public Health Service regulation promulgated in the year after this case stated
that "the diagnosis .. .is, as a rule, based upon the social history of the individual and
without this history it is seldom possible to make it." U.S. Public Health Service Regu-
lations Governing the Medical Examination of Aliens § 59 (rev. Aug. 30, 1930), quoted
in United States ex tel. Leon v. Shaughnessy, 143 F. Supp. 270, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1956),
aff'd mtb m. United States ex rel. Leon v. Murff, 250 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1957). Never-
theless, Powlowec is cited as the single controlling authority in two per curiam opinions.
United States ex tel. Kreisberg v. Day, 37 F.2d 1014 (2d Cir. 1930) ; United States ex
rel. De Brito v. Corsi, 72 F.2d 1022 (2d Cir. 1934).
15. Statute cited note 10 supra.
16. 33 F.2d at 268. The court's definition reads in full: "[The phrase] was intended
to include those who by nature were subject to insanity of one sort or another; that is
to say, whose constitution was such that they had not normal mental stability ...
[T]heir inferiority ...is inherent in their nervous structure." This definition unduly
emphasizes the now outmoded neurological theory of the cause of psychopathy, and com-
pletely overlooks the sociopathic characteristics of the condition. See discussion and ma-
terials cited in note 10 supra. It also utilizes the legal term "insanity," which is not used
in clinical terminology and is particularly inappropriate to an exposition of psychopathy
because this condition is rarely of legal significance, while "insanity" has well established
legal consequences. Psychopathic personality, unlike insanity, is hardly ever a defense to
criminal liability, WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIINAL LAw 97 (1933),
or sufficient grounds for civil commitment, CLECxLEY 31, 37.
17. 33 F.2d at 268.
"[T]hose formally qualified" apparently means psychiatrists, not immigration officers.
But, by refusing to question the instant officer's choice between conflicting expert
opinions, the court expresses equal deference to him.
If neither the merit of psychiatric opinion nor the hearing officer's choice of experts
can be judicially evaluated, judicial review for sufficiency of evidence is little more than
an empty formality. In Powlowec, the Government's evidence was questionable at best.
The alien had been discharged from a mental hospital as a "psychopathic personality-
condition recovered." He was then certified by one psychiatrist, after a half-hour ex-
amination, as having been a psychopath at time of entry. A board of three Public Health
Service psychiatrists found him "free from mental defects" and declined to find that he
had been mentally ill at time of entry. Id. at 267. The court sustained the immigration
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The Powlowec rationale was recently employed in United States ex rel.
Lcon v. M -irff'8 to restrict the scope of judicial review still further. The
alien, a Cuban national, was admitted into the United States for permanent
residence in 1942; she re-entered six years later after a trip to Cuba.19 In
1950, following an altercation in which she struck a bartender with a bottle,
she was committed to a mental hospital.20 Her condition was diagnosed as
"psychosis with psychopathic personality, paranoid trends."2' 1 Released five
months later, she resumed gainful employment and was not apprehended on
any subsequent charge. 2 The hospital forwarded her record to the Immigra-
tion Service, 23 which, two years after her release, summoned her before a
special inquiry officer.2 4 He found that she was deportable as a person
afflicted with "constitutional psychopathic inferiority" at the time of her re-
entry in 1948.2 1 The evidence consisted primarily of a medical certificate to
this effect based on the following history:
officer's determination even though the medical certification of prior illness failed to
specify the grounds on which it was based. The court did suggest that such specifica-
tion would have been desirable.
The requisite content of medical certificates has caused difficulty in other types of
cases. Compare United States ex rel. Fong On v. Day, 54 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1932) (cer-
tification containing only conclusion as to alien's age held sufficient), weith United States
ex rel. Papa v. Day, 45 F.2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1930) (medical certification of tuberculosis
held insufficient evidence of excludability because it failed to state qualifications of phy-
sician and grounds for conclusion). Generally, however, courts have not gone behind
medical certificates. See Annot., 93 L. Ed. 1063, 1065-66 ('1950), and cases cited therein.
But cf. United States ex -el. Devenuto v. Curran, 299 Fed. 206, 213 (2d Cir. 1924)
("[W]here an alien is excluded on the ground that he cannot read, the courts are en-
titled to know exactly what test was used.").
18. 250 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1957), affirming United States ex rel. Leon v. Shaughnessy,
143 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
19. 143 F. Supp. at 271. In this connection, see discussion of the "re-entry doctrine"
in note 25 infra.
20, 250 F.2d at 437; Brief for Appellant, pp. 58a, 66a.
21. 250 F.2d at 437; Brief for Appellant, p. 57a.
22. 250 F.2d at 440.
23. Brief for Appellant, p. 20a. The court ruled that this action was proper under
N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 23, in spite of a conflicting rule against the divulgence
of confidential medical records in N.Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr § 352. 250 F.2d at 440.
There is no privilege against self-incrimination in deportation proceedings. United
States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923) ; Loufakis v. United States, 81
F.2d 966 (3d Cir. 1936) ; cf. United States v. Matles, 247 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1957), rev'd,
356 U.S. 256 (1958).
24. The alien was discharged from the hospital on May 27, 1951, and deportation
hearings were commenced on May 1.1, 1953. 143 F. Supp. at 271, 275.
25. Id. at 271.
The Act of 1952 provides that the law in effect at the time of the challenged entry
.hall be applied in cases of delayed exclusion. Statute cited note 1 supra; Act of 1952,
§ 405(a), 66 Stat. 280, note to 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1952).
Under the "re-entry doctrine," a long-time resident alien who voluntarily travels
abroad is subject upon his return to the same tests, and is only entitled to the same
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THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Patient was a problem in childhood, eloped from school with a man at
age of 15, has had two divorces and has lived without marriage with a
man for the past nine years, except for brief interval when she married
and deserted husband. Described by others as unreliable, untruthful, in-
temperate, quarrelsome, and bad tempered.
26
Hospital records also revealed that she had once been treated in this country
for alcoholism.2 7 After the hearing officer had ordered her deportation, she
exhausted her administrative remedies,28 then petitioned for and was denied
constitutional rights, as if he were entering for the first time. Act of 1952, § 101(a)
(13), 66 Stat. 167, 8 U.S.C. § 1.101(a) (13) (1952) ; Pimental-Navarro v. Del Guercio,
256 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1958). "Re-entry permits" serve only to fulfill the requirement
for a visa. Act of 1952, § 223(e), 66 Stat. 195, 8 U.S.C. § 1203(e) (1952). Exclusion
and "delayed exclusion" under the re-entry rule accomplish indirectly the same result
as deportation. KONVITZ, CIVIL RIGHTS IN IMMIGRATION 92 (1953). And the threat of
such exclusion imposes a restraint upon the alien's freedom to travel. Since an alien
once within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States is entitled to procedural due
process of law in immigration proceedings, note 5 supra, it seems unnecessarily harsh
and unduly conceptualistic to revoke these rights merely because the alien temporarily
absents himself from the country. This feeling is reflected in judicial reluctance to apply
the re-entry rule in some cases. E.g., Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 601
(1953); United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621. (1888); Chew Heong v. United
States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884). But see Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345
U.S. 206 (1953), for an extremely harsh application of the rule.
Relief from the re-entry doctrine is available at the Attorney General's discretion.
Act of 1952, § 211(b), 66 Stat. 181, 8 U.S.C. § 1181.(b) (1952). But the exercise of
such discretion is probably not reviewable. Cf. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956). The
rule is criticized in WHOM WE SHALL WELcOME 179, 199-200.
26. 143 F. Supp. at 272.
27. This and other details of the alien's personal history appear in the Brief for
Appellant, pp. 56a-59a, partially quoted in 143 F. Supp. at 271.
28. The first decision of the special inquiry officer is set forth in Brief for Appel-
lant, pp. 19a-24a. Upon appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals held the evidence in-
sufficient because certification by the Public Health Service was based not on any "actual
examination" but upon hospital records alone. The Board ordered the proceedings re-
opened for further medical examination. The Board's opinion appears in id. at 25a-26a.
After a single examination, the Public Health Service reiterated its former diagnosis:
"In view of the history and the patient's present condition there appears to be no doubt
that the patient was properly certified . . . ." This certification was contradicted by a
mental hygiene specialist and a psychiatrist, both of whom had examined the alien at
considerable length. The hearing officer found the alien deportable. See the second de-
cision of the special inquiry officer, id. at 27a-33a.
Respondent appealed the second deportation order to the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals, which dismissed. The opinion is set forth in id. at 34a-39a. Unaccountably, the
Board made no mention of the personal examination which it had previously emphasized.
"In our opinion, the clinical report of respondent's 1950-1951 illness ...amply supports
the Public Health Service certification that respondent was a person afflicted with con-
stitutional psychopathic inferiority at the time of her last entry." Id. at 39a.
The Board would appear to have been correct in requiring a personal examination.
But, in view of the conflicting testimony, its reliance upon the report of a single Public
Health Service officer who conducted only one examination is unconvincing. Prevailing
[Vol. 68:931
ALIENS EXCLUDABLE AS PSYCHOPATHS
a writ of habeas corpus.29 On appeal, she argued that the phrase "constitu-
tional psychopathic inferiority" had never been given a "proper definition." 30
Denying relief, the Second Circuit held that the statutory language had been
construed in the Powlowec case.3 ' The court then quoted the Powlowec state-
ment favoring the conclusiveness of expert opinion, and thus implied that the
task of statutory construction as well as that of weighing evidence was prop-
erly left to administrative discretion.
3 2
medical authority and interviews with Public Health Service psychiatrists indicate that
"psychopathic personality" is an unusually difficult condition to diagnose, NOvES, MODERN
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 412 (3d ed. 1949) [hereinafter cited as NOYES], and that ex-
tensive personal examination is essential, ENGLUsH & FINCH, INTRODUCTION TO PSY-
CHIATRY 261 (2d ed. 1957). "[S]ome of the most radical nonconformists may be rela-
tively healthy." Redlich, The Concept of Health in Psychiatry, in ExPLORATIONS IN
SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY 138, 153 (Leighton, Clausen & Wilson ed. 1957).
29. 143 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
Under the 1917 act, the governing statute in Leon, see note 25 supra, habeas corpus
was the only avenue to judicial review. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 234-35 (1953).
This remedy is unavailable until personal restraint has been imposed. Recent cases have
held, however, that, under the 1952 act, review can also be had by suit for declaratory
judgment. Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956); Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro,
349 U.S. 48 (1955).
The question whether Congress could constitutionally preclude all judicial review of
expulsion orders is answered in the negative in Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit
the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1362,
1387-96 (1953).
30. 250 F.2d at 439.
31. Ibid. For the Powlowec definition, see note 16 supra. A more recent judicial
interpretation by the same court that decided Powlowec and Leon appears in United
States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405, 411 (2d Cir. 1956): "We understand this
little-understood and rarely interpreted phrase-presumably out of the psychology books
-to characterize individuals who show a life-long and constitutional tendency not to
conform to group customs, and who habitually misbehave so flagrantly that they are
continually in trouble with authorities." Compared with the Powlowec definition, Flores
reflects the current disrepute of the neurological approach, see note 10 supra. It is diffi-
cult to see how the appellant in Leon could have been deported under the Flores inter-
pretation. See text accompanying note 39 infra. Although the Leon court cited Flores,
it did not distinguish or discuss it. 250 F.2d at 439. More significant, perhaps, is the
court's failure to apply the current standards established by the Public Health Service.
See United States ex rel. Johnson v. Shaughnessy, 336 U.S. 806 (1949) (administrative
regulations in an exclusion case must be observed) ; cf. Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363
(1957). The U.S. Public Health Service Manual for Medical Examination of Aliens in
force since 1950 states, at p. II-1---6, that:
It is ...necessary that the written records of the physician's examination in-
clude statements of fact indicating that the condition of psychopathic inferiority,
or the symptoms that indicate this diagnosis, were present, and are traceable rather
clearly back to the early years of the individual's existence, and -therefore could
be considered to have been present at birth.
32. 250 F.2d at 439. The implication follows from the Powlowec case, quoted in
text at note 17 supra, since complete discretion as to sufficiency of evidence is ultimately
the same as complete discretion to interpret statutory language.
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So read, the Leon case makes administrative officials solely responsible for
interpreting what is probably the most disputed and open-ended diagnostic
label in the field of psychiatry.3 3 Unlike other types of mental illness, "psy-
chopathic personality" is not associated with cognitive or emotional disturb-
ances; rather, its identifying characteristic is a long-standing pattern of cul-
turally unacceptable behavior.34 Psychopaths are intellectually cognizant of
their environment, their conduct, and the moral and legal standards obtaining
in the community, but appear to lack an effective "conscience" to control their
antisocial impulses.3 1 Consequently, diagnosis requires the application of pre-
vailing social norms to persons who may be mentally ill only by virtue of
criminal, "eccentric," or "unusual" behavior.3 6 Recognizing this, the Public
Health Service regulations relied upon in Leon provide that:
There shall be certified as cases of constitutional psychopathic inferiority
all psychopathic characters such as "chronic litigants," "sexual perverts,"
"pathological liars," "dipsomaniacs," "moral imbeciles," and mentally
peculiar persons who because of eccentric behavior, defective judgment.
33. NozS 410 (Psychopathic personality "is considered by many to be a meaning-
less designation .... Not yet is there any common agreement . . . as to classification
or . . . etiology."); Curran & Mallinson, supra note 10, at 278 ("The only conclusion
that seems warrantable is that, at some time or other and by some reputable authority,
the term psychopathic personality has been used to designate every conceivable type of
abnormal character.") ; Guttmacher, supra note 10, at 154 ("At present, the diagnosis of
a psychopathic personality is practically meaningless.'); Tappan, Sexual Offences and
Treatment of Sexual Offenders in the United States, in SEXUAL OFFENCES 500, 507
(Radzinowicz ed. 1957) ("consensus is impossible in the no man's land of psychopathic
personality").
Congress was aware of the nebulous meaning of the term. "Although the term 'psy-
chopathic personality' is vague and indefinite, no more appropriate expression can be
suggested at this time .... Until a more definite expression can be devised, the term
'psychopathic personality' should be retained." Report of the Public Health Service on
the Medical Aspects of H.R. 2379, in H.R. Rm. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 46-47
(1952).
34. United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405, 411 (2d Cir. 1956), quoted
note 31 supra; Report of the Public Health Service on the Medical Aspects of H.R.
2379, supra note 33 ("The conditions classified within the group of psychopathic per-
sonalities . . . are characterized by developmental defects or pathological trends in the
personality structure manifest by lifelong patterns of action or behavior, rather than by
mental or emotional symptoms."); CLECKLEY 28; ROYAL CoMtrMIssION ON CAPITAL
PUNIsHmENT, REPORT 137 (1953) ; Note, 28 TEmP. L.Q. 623 (1955).
Although the diagnostic label "psychopathic personality" is sometimes linked with
other classifications pertaining to psychosis or neurosis (as in the Leon case, see text
accompanying note 21 supra) a number of contemporary authorities reject this associa-
tion as unsound. E.g., ENGLISH & FINch, op. cit. supra note 28, at 261; Guttmacher,
supra note 10, at 142.
35. Gough, A Sociological Theory of Psychopathy, in MENTAL HEALTH AND MEN-
TAL DisoRaDa 279 (Rose ed. 1956); ENGLISH & FINCH, op. cit. supra note 28, at 239,
261; Guttmacher, supra note 10, at 150.
36. See NoTEs 412.
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or abnormal impulses are in repeated conflict with social customs and
constituted authorities.
37
Thus, since Powlowec approves a deportation order based solely upon post-
entry behavior, virtually any unconventional conduct in this country might
give rise to an inference of psychopathic personality at time of entry and
result in deportation.3 8 In Lean, for example, the severe sanction of expulsion
from the United States after more than fifteen years of permanent residence
was based primarily upon a single instance of disorderly conduct, a brief
treatment for alcoholism, and a history of marital instability. 9 Similar con-
37. U.S. Public Health Service Regulations Governing the Medical Examination of
Aliens § 59 (rev. Aug. 30, 1930), quoted in 143 F. Supp. at 272-73. These regulations
have presumably been repealed, since no definition of "psychopathic personality" is in-
cluded in the current regulations governing the medical examination of aliens. See 42
C.F.R. §§ 34.1-.14 (Supp. 19538). The Service relies upon standard treatises, in particular
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-Mental Disorders, of the American Psychiatric
Association Mental Hospital Service (1952). Interviews with Dr. Eugene W. Green,
Chief, Psychiatric Service, and Staff Psychiatrists, U.S. Public Health Service Hospital,
Staten Island, N.Y., Jan. 9, 1.959. This manual defines "personality disorder-antisocial
reaction" as follows:
This term refers to chronically antisocial individuals who are always in trouble,
profiting neither from experience nor punishment, and maintaining no real loyal-
ties to any person, group, or code. They are frequently callous and hedonistic,
showing marked emotional immaturity, with lack of sense of responsibility, lack
of judgment, and an ability to rationalize their behavior so that it appears warranted,
reasonable, and justified.
The term includes cases previously classified as "constitutional psychopathic state"
and "psychopathic personality." As defined here the term is more limited, as well
as more specific in its application.
38. "[Tlhe extent to which these distorting processes may extend before the per-
sonality is to be called pathological is a matter of individual opinion and not determined
by definite criteria." No,-s 412. "The problem of a model [of health or normality]
brings with it the accompanying intrusions of value judgments . . . ." Leighton, Clausen
& Wilson, Some Key Ismes in Social Psychiatry, in ExPLoRAiONs IN SoCIAl. PsY-
cHIATRY 3, 7 (Leighton, Clausen & Wilson ed. 1957). For the great range of behavior
which may be called "psychopathic," see generally CjxcxLsz 380-417; KAHN, PsYcHo-
PATHIC PERSONALITIES (1931). Under the rules governing judicial review for sufficiency
of evidence in these cases, all that is required to deport an alien is the unfavorable testi-
mony of one psychiatrist. See notes 17, 28 siepra.
Cultural relativity in a broader sense is pertinent to the analysis of an alien's deport-
ability. For behavior which violates the standards of one society may be accepted in an-
other. Thus, in the Leo)t case, one of the alien's psychiatric witnesses testified that:
"[W]e see many young individuals elope and there is nothing wrong about the situation
and even at the age of fifteen for a Latin person who matures sexually a little before
the Caucasian individual . . . ." Brief for Appellant, p. Sla.
In view of the above, it is at least questionable whether diagnosis of psychopathic
personality for the purpose of establishing deportability is primarily a medical problem.
39. It is dubious that these incidents meet the medically avowed requirements for a
"lifelong pattern" of "repeated conflict" with law or social customs. (The Powlowec case,
of course, holds such previous history to be unnecessary. Text accompanying note 14
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duct could undoubtedly be found in the personal histories of many resident
aliens and used to deport them.
4 0
The vague language of the "psychopath" clause impinges upon the due
process requirement that a penal provision must forewarn potential offenders
by specifically describing what conduct will result in punishment.41 True, the
courts generally do not view deportation as a criminal sanction. 42 But a find-
ing of psychopathic personality based upon postentry behavior operates to
penalize antisocial conduct occurring in this country. 43 Because of the "grave
nature of deportation," the Supreme Court assumed in Jordan v. De George
that a deportation statute, while not technically penal, can be "void for vague-
supra.) Epithets such as "unreliable, untruthful, intemperate, quarrelsome, and bad-
tempered" would not seem to remedy the paucity of deviant behavior revealed by the
evidence. Brief for Appellant, p. 55a. Furthermore, the diagnosis of postentry psychosis,
see text accompanying note 21 supra, does not support an inference of psychopathic per-
sonality at entry. U.S. Public Health Service, Manual for Medical Examination of
Aliens 11-1-7 (1950).
40. See CLzcxLzy 35-38 (psychopathic personality "hundreds of times more common
than poliomyelitis").
41. For this requirement, see Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 97 (1948) ("Legislation
may run afoul of the Due Process Clause because it fails to give adequate guidance to
those who would be law-abiding .... ") ; Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453
(1939) ("All are entitled to be informed as to what the state commands or forbids.").
Cases are collected in Annot., 83 L.Ed. 893 (1939).
-Since the vagueness doctrine is designed to protect persons from unforeseeable dep-
rivation, it follows that its protection is properly available only to those who are capable
of choosing between compliance and noncompliance. No definite knowledge exists on
whether psychopaths are capable of such a choice. The consensus appears to be that many
but not all criminals are psychopaths, and that, at some point, psychopathic criminals are
partially capable of societal compliance and amenable to deterrents. CLECMLEY 292-94;
Guttmacher, supra note 10, at 145; NovS 410. Since psychopaths demonstrate no cog-
nitive or emotional disturbances, they are rarely subject to commitment and are almost
always held criminally responsible for their conduct. ROYAL CoMI-MIssIoN ON CAITAL
PUNISHMENT, REFORT 139 (1953); CL cKLEY 37, 515; WPAHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DE-
FENSE ix CRiMiNAL LAw 97 (1933). Until it is certain that the potential psychopath
is incapable of choosing between compliance and noncompliance, he should be entitled
to forewarning of prohibited conduct. See Rockwell, Nosology and The Law, in CURRENT
PROBLRmS m, PSYcHiATnuc DIAGNOSIS 138 (Hoch & Zubin ed. 1953). Contra, Note, 62
HARV. L. Rav. 77, 78 n.8 (1948).
42. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580, 594 (1952) ; Bugajewitz v. Adams,. 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913) ; Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893).
43. Depoitation has frequently been recognized by the courts as a form of punish-
ment. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (Deportation is "the forfeiture
for misconduct of a residence in this country. Such a forfeiture is a penalty.") ; United
States ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1926) ("However heinous his
crimes, deportation is to him exile, a dreadful punishment, abandoned by the common
consent of all civilized peoples."). See generally KONvTZ, CrviL RIGHTS IN I-MMIGRATION
ch. 2 (1953); Wxom WE SHALL WELcomE 200-03; VAN VLECK, op. cit. supra note 7,
at 219-90; Bullitt, Deportatio* as a Denial of Substantive Due Process, 28 WASH. L.
REv. 205 (1953) (deportation characterized as "administrative punishment for bad char-
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ness." 44 At issue was a provision authorizing the expulsion of aliens twice
convicted of "crimes involving moral turpitude." A majority upheld the act,
over strong dissent, on the ground that "moral turpitude" was adequately
defined by long legal usage.45 Unlike this phrase, "psychopathic personality"
has no "deep roots in the law." Nor does legislative history, judicial and ad-
ministrative interpretation, or medical authority provide a workable defini-
tion.4
6
Constitutional strictures as to vagueness might be circumvented if the Pow-
lowec case were overruled and deportability were determined exclusively from
evidence of pre-entry behavior. The "psychopath" clause then would not
operate to penalize conduct in this country, and hence would look less like
a criminal provision. As a result, the vagueness doctrine might be inappli-
cable.47 Excluding evidence of postentry behavior, however, would not resolve
yet another constitutional problem-that of providing adequate legislative
standards for administrators determining what conduct supports a diagnosis
of "psychopathic personality."
acter"); Note, 37 Mirx. L. REv. 440, 456-58 (1953) (grounds for deportation "read
... like a penal code").
Absent a private congressional bill, a deported alien can gain readmission only at the
discretion of the Attorney General. Act of 1952, § 212(a),(17), 66 Stat. 183, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a) (17) (1952).
44. 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951).
45. Id. at 227-29, 232.
46. Lack of authority in support of any one definition underlay the dissent by four
justices in Jordan. Id. at 232. "Moral turpitude," they said, was a term "knowingly
conceived . . . in confusion" by Congress. Id. at 233. The same can be said of "psycho-
pathic personality," see note 33 supra, to which judicial interpretation has only added
confusion. See notes 16, 31 supra. The Supreme Court's refusal to condemn "sexual-
psychopath" laws for undue vagueness, Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309
U.S. 270 (1940), is inapposite because these laws are aimed at a particular type of
deviant behavior-sexual-while the "psychopath" clause of the immigration statute con-
demns virtually any "eccentric' conduct.
Administrative decisions construing "psychopathic personality" are likewise bewilder-
ing. See the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision in Brief for Appellant, pp. 34a-
39a, 250 F.2d 436 (1957), discussed in note 28 supra. Compare 5 1. & N. Dec. 209
(1953); 2 I. & N. Dec. 68 (1944).
Medical authority on "psychopathic personality" also proclaims the inadequacy of the
phrase. See note 33 supra. Unlike most other medical. categories, it necessitates a per-
sonal estimate of community mores by.psychiatrists, administrators, and courts. See note
38 supra. Thus, the question posed 'by the dissent in Jordan is pertinent: "How should
we ascertain the moral sentiments of masses of persons on any better basis than a guess ?"
341 U.S. at 238.
47. While removing the element of retribution for antisocial behavior within United
States jurisdiction, this solution would neither less en the severity of deportation as a
deprivation, nor alter the fact that it is associated with misconduct. Thus, the vagueness
doctrine still might be applied, especially since legislation has sometimes been held void
for vagueness in civil proceedings simply because it defied rational interpretation and
application. E.g., A. B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233, 239 (1,925);
see Annot., 70 L.Ed. 322, 323 (1927) (collecting cases) ; Note, 62 Hagv. L. REv. 77-78
n.5 (1948).
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Congress may not constitutionally delegate to administrative officials the
authority to impose serious sanctions unless it provides the officials with suf-
ficiently precise statutory guidance.48 This doctrine-originally utilized to
preserve the separation of the legislative and executive branches 49 -has also
been expounded as a necessary prophylaxis against the creation of excessive
and arbitrary administrative power.50 Although the delegation doctrine is now
seemingly defunct in the field of federal economic regulation,51 the Supreme
Court has recently revived it to check inroads upon personal liberty, and has
suggested a different rationale. In Watkins v. United States, the Court held
that a resolution authorizing a congressional committee to investigate "un-
American propaganda" delegated the power of the House of Representatives
to compel testimony without "sufficient particularity" to preserve authority
over and responsibility for the committee's action.52 Accordingly, the Court
reversed the contempt conviction of a witness who refused to testify before
the committee. In the more recent case of Kent v. Dulles, the delegation
doctrine was employed to justify the narrow interpretation of a statute au-
thorizing the Secretary of State to grant or deny passports under "such rules
48. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530 (1935);
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 415 (1935).
Although the issue of improper delegation has been frequently raised, only in Schech-
ter and Panama did the Court find congressional delegations to administrative officials
invalid. 1 DAvis, ADmINxSTRATIVE LAW § 2.01, at 76 (1958).
49. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) : "That Congress cannot delegate legis-
lative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the in-
tegrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution."
But see United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911) : "It must be admitted that
it is difficult to define the line which separates legislative power to make laws, from
administrative authority to make regulations."
50. See Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1939); A. L. A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537-42 (1935) ; Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388, 432-33 (1935) ; United States v. Goldsmith, 91 F.2d 983, 985 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 302 U.S. 718 (1937). See generally Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legisla-
live Power (pt. 2), 47 CoLum. L. Ray. 561, 561-66 (1947).
51. See, e.g., Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 142-46 (1941)
(Fair Labor Standards Act); 1 DAVIs, AD INISTRATiVE LAW § 2.15, at 150 (1958) :
GELLHORN & BYsE, ADmINIsTRnTE LAW 1,14 (1954). The courts have upheld broad
delegations in large part because of Congress' inability to provide detailed regulatory
legislation in an expanding, fluctuating, complex economy. See, e.g., Opp Cotton Mills,
Inc. v. Administrator, sufpra at 145; Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S.
381, 398 (1940) ; Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 622 (2d Cir. 1944).
52. 354 U.S. 178, 203-05 (1957) (alternative holding).
The majority opinion also held that the conviction must be reversed under the vague-
ness doctrine because the witness had been unable to evaluate the "pertinence" of the
question and hence to determine whether or not he would be criminally liable if he failed
to respond. Id. at 206-15. One Justice, by concurring specially on this ground alone, id.
at 216-17, indicated that the delegation doctrine was vital to the majority's decision.
See also Sacher v. United States, 252 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 356 U.S.
576 (1958).
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as the President may designate." 3 The Court reasoned that a literal con-
struction of this language might render the statute an unconstitutionally broad
delegation of power restricting an important liberty. 4 Implicit in these cases
is the premise that representative rule cannot be effective if Congress, through
sweeping statutory language, transfers the power to formulate fundamental
policy. In violation of this principal, Congress, by authorizing the delayed
exclusion of "psychopathic" aliens, has vested in unelected officials virtually
unlimited power to impose deprivations of personal liberty which may be
more severe than those at issue in the Watkins and Kent decisions.56 Con-
sequently, if ordinary constitutional inhibitions govern the deportation of
aliens, the "psychopath" clause delegates an impermissible degree of congres-
sional power.
The "psychopath" clause may be invulnerable to the delegation doctrine,
53. 357 U.S. 116 (1958). The statute appears at 44 Stat. 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C.
§ 211(a) (1952).
54. 357 U.S. at 129-30.
55. Compare United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1.958) (dissenting
opinion) ("The power to make laws under which men are punished for crimes calls for
... serious . . . deliberation . . . [and] the exercise of legislative judgment."); Levine
v. O'Connell, 275 App. Div. 217, 224, 88 N.Y.S.2d 672, 677-78 (1949), aff'd, 300 N.Y.
658, 91 N.E.2d 322 (1950) ("[T]he orderly processes of representative government re-
quire that the Legislature should make ... important decisions itself."). See also United
States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 190 (1956) ("Congress has not provided with sufficient
clarity that the subpoena power . . . ex-tends over persons who are the subject of de-
naturalization investigations... ").
The majority in Watkins stated that the House committee's charter defied judicial
interpretation. 354 U.S. at 204. More accurately, judicial interpretation would have re-
suited either in ratifying whatever the committee did under its broad grant of authority
or in substituting the Court's own definition of "un-American" for the committee's.
Both alternatives were properly rejected, for this responsibility rested with the entire
House of Representatives. See 1 DAvis, ADMINsSTRATwn LAW §§ 2.04-.05 (1958) ; cf. Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 532 (1952) (concurring opinion).
While "many questions of basic policy may better be worked out by an agency than
by a legislative body," 1 DAvis, ADmmrsSraTiv LAW § 2.15, at 149 (1958), and courts
can control administrative discretion by judicial review, the question still remains which
policy decisions may be made by the legislature rather than by administrative officials
or courts. Relying to a considerable extent upon judicial review as a means of con-
trolling administrative action under broad statutory language, some contemporary com-
mentators suggest that courts are better suited than administrators to make important
policy decisions without a clear mandate from Congress. See 1 id. § 2.15; COOPER, AD-
MIaIsTRATIvE AGENCIES AND- THE CouRTs 34 (,1951); Nutting, Congressional Delegationls
Since the Schechter Case, 14 Miss. L.J. 350, 367 (1942). But this suggestion contra-
dicts the institutional considerations which stimulated the growth of the administrative
process. See, e.g., GELLHoRN & BYsE, ADmINIsTRATM LAW 1-21 (1.954). "[I]n final
analysis the problem is one of determining what organs of -the government are best
qualified to determine particular policies." 1 DAvis, ADmiNIsTRA-v LAW § 2.16, at 153
(1958).
56. Cases and materials cited note 43 supra.
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however, if it implements congressional policy in foreign affairs.57 Admitted-
ly, broad executive authority to deport enemy aliens or to expel foreigners
as a diplomatic measure may be necessary ;58 and, arguably, the exclusion of
undesirable immigrants is connected with the conduct of foreign relations.,"
Hence, extensive delegations of congressional power in these areas can per-
haps be justified. But to view the deportation of an alien psychopath long
resident in the United States as effectuating foreign policy or as combating
an external danger is absurdly unrealistic. The judiciary can require more
precise statutory standards in this type of case without infringing upon any
legislative prerogative necessary to the conduct of foreign affairs.00
57. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318-22 (1936)
(congressional delegations of power to the President for the conduct of foreign relations
need not satisfy the requirement of adequate standards). In United States ex rel. Knauff
v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542-43 (1950), an exclusion case, the Court, citing Cur-
tiss-Wright, rejected a defense predicated on the delegation doctrine, but explicitly left
undecided the doctrine's applicability in deportation cases.
58. Emergency executive authority over aliens is found in the Act of 1952, § 215,
66 Stat. 190, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1952), and in the Alien Enemy Act §§ 1-3, 1 Stat. 577
(1798), as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-23 (1952). See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580, 591 (1952) (the judiciary should not "deprive our ... Government of a power
of defense and reprisal without obtaining for American citizens abroad any reciprocal
privileges or immunities.").
59. On this theory, the courts have denied virtually all constitutional protection too
aliens in exclusion proceedings. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603-06 (18,9);
United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1903) ; Lem Moon Sing
v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895).
The power of Congress to exclude has been held immune from procedural as well as
substantive limitations. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544
(1950) ; see Shaughnessy v. United States ex rtel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 214 (1953);
KoNviTz, Civii, RIGHTS IN ImmIGoATIoN 39-53 (1953). The present statute provides
only a limited hearing in exclusion proceedings which may be denied at the Attorney
General's discretion. Act of 1952, §§ 235, 236, 66 Stat. 198-200, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225-26
(1952).
Judicial intervention on constitutional grounds may not be foreclosed, however. The
Mezei and Knauff cases, supra, gave rise to strong dissenting opinions asserting the
requirement of procedural due process in exclusion proceedings; and United States cx
reL. Johnson v. Shaughnessy, 336 U.S. 806 (1949), held that an exclusion proceeding in
violation of administrative regulations constituted an improper hearing.
60. Although the delegation doctrine has never been successfully urged against an
immigration statute, two cases suggest that deportation provisions are not immune from
its requirements. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 544 (1952) ("This is a permissible
delegation of legislative power because the executive judgment is limited by adequate
standards.") ; Rubenstein v. Brownell, 206 F2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (delegation argu-
ment considered; held, "discretion not an arbitrary and capricious one").
The delegation of power to deport an "undesirable resident" under the Act of May
10, 1920, ch. 174, §§ 1-3, 41 Stat. 593, was approved in Mahler v. Elby, 264 U.S. 32, 40-
41 (1924). The Court rejected an argument based on the delegation doctrine because
"The sovereign power to expel aliens ...is vested in the political departments ...
[and] Congress can not in the -nature of things, desiguate all the persons to be excluded
[sic]." Id. at 40. The Court also reasoned, however, that "previous legislation of a
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Adequate standards cannot be provided by judicial interpretation, as in the
Kent case, 01 since no nucleus of accepted meaning inheres in the phrase "psy-
chopathic personality."'6 2 Accordingly, the courts should declare the provision
unconstitutional. To shirk this declaration and say that the remedy for un-
limited administrative discretion must come from Congress alone, as was as-
serted in Powlowec, 3 is to ignore the delegation doctrine. This doctrine is
essential to the integrity of representative government as conceived by the
advocates of judicial deference to Congress.6 4 Moreover, for those commen-
tators and jurists who read the Constitution as limiting popular sovereignty,
the Powlowec solution means the abdication of an essential judicial function.
In their view, the judiciary is the institution responsible for checking the
majority abuse of minority groups such as aliens. 65
similar character" provided criteria which limited executive discretion. Ibid. Moreover,
"undesirable resident" was limited by the statute to aliens who had violated specifically
named war legislation. In any event, the Court's discussion of the delegation issue was
dictum, since the case was reversed on other grounds. Id. at 45-46.
61. In Kent, it was not necessary to strike down the statute. A considerable body
of precedent enabled the Court to frame a narrow interpretation without relying ex-
clusively upon its own or the Secretary of State's discretion. 357 U.S. at 124-28.
62. True, courts have with some difficulty given content to elastic statutory stand-
ards for naturalization, such as "good moral character" and "attached to the principles
of the Constitution," currently prescribed by the Act of 1952, § 316(a), 66 Stat. 242, 8
U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1952). See, e.g., Schmidt v. United States, 177 F.2d 450 (2d Cir.
1949); United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929), overruled in Girouard v.
United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). But these phrases are more limited by precedent than
"psychopathic personality." Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 244 (1952); Annot., 75 L. Ed. 1316
(1931). Moreover, denial of citizenship is not as severe a deprivation as deportation;
hence, such denial can more properly be delegated to administrative or judicial discretion.
See text accompanying note 48 sitpra.
63. 33 F.2d at 268.
64. It is of course true that when a court holds that a legislature has left too much
latitude to an administrative tribunal, it overrules a decision of the legislature as
to its powers; but there appears to me a tenable distinction between that situation
and one where a court overrules the actual exercise of legislative authority; for
the delegation of authority is pro tanto the abdication of authority over the sub-
ject matter by a transfer to others of authority that the legislature alone may
exercise. Once we assume that courts are to set the boundaries of each "Depart-
ment's" authority, it follows that they must say where legislation begins, however
hazy its boundaries may be.
HAND, BILL OF RIGHTS 49 (1958).
A constitution is primarily an instrument to distribute political power; and so far
as it is, it is hard to escape the necessity of some tribunal with authority to de-
clare when the prescribed distribution has been disturbed.
HAND, THE SPIRaT OF LImR 159 (2d ed. Dilliard 1953).
65. "[The Constitution] is the guarantee of the minority, who, when threatened by
the impatient vehemence of a majority, can appeal to this permanent law, finding the
interpreter and enforcer thereof in a court set high above the assaults of faction."
I BRYcE, THE AmaucAN COMONwEALTH 273 (rev. ed. 1913); see West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 636-40 (1943) ("One's right to life, liberty,
19591
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
If Congress, as a matter of legislative policy, utilizes delayed exclusion to
correct oversights occurring in the examination of entering aliens, it should
not only supply statutory criteria which meet the requirements of the delega-
tion doctrine but should also subject deportation for previous excludability to
a statute of limitations. 66 A requirement that grounds for exclusion over-
looked at time of entry be discovered within one year should not prove ad-
ministratively impractical. Were Congress to forbid proceedings initiated
thereafter, it would avoid the cruel uprooting of established residents on the
basis of long-past conditions or events.
Preferably, Congress should simply abolish the delayed exclusion of psy-
chopaths. The proscribed condition straddles the borderline between mental
health and mental illness. 67 Its diagnosis is difficult under the best of con-
ditions and is persistently embroiled in medical controversy. More important,
the public would be adequately protected in the absence of the "psychopath"
clause. The condition is not hereditary, as Congress once assumed. 8 Danger-
ous antisocial behavior will ordinarily result in a criminal sentence or commit-
ment to an institution. If an alien is convicted of "crimes involving moral
turpitude" or institutionalized at public expense, he is deportable under other
provisions of the Immigration Act.6 9 In sum, the delayed exclusion of alien
psychopaths is an unnecessary as well as undesirable feature of immigration
policy.
and property . . . and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they
depend on the outcome of no elections."). Some historical roots of this view and objec-
tions to it are discussed in Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66
HAgv. L. REv. 193, 193-210 (1952).
For the suggestion that constitutional rights of citizens are linked to those of aliens,
see Comment, 20 U. Cl. L. REv. 547 (1953). Cf. Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S.
654, 675-76 (1946) (dissenting opinion).
Approximately 2.8 million aliens reside in the United States. 1957 Im.MiGRATioN &
NATURALIZATION SERvicE ANN. REP. 7.
66. The five-year limitation set by the Immigration Act of 1917, note 10 supra, was
not carried over into the Act of 1952 because "if the cause for exclusion existed at the
time of entry, it is believed that such aliens are just as undesirable at any subsequent
time as they are within the 5 years after entry." S. REaP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
389 (1950).
No one has suggested any sound reason why the purpose of limitations-recog-
nition of the unfairness involved in requiring a person to make a defense long
after the event, when it is difficult or impossible to assemble witnesses and evi-
dence-does not apply to immigration matters at least with equal force as to
prosecution for serious crimes.
WHoM WE SHALL WELCOME 198. A limitation period of ten years was recommended.
Ibid.
67. NoYvs 410; WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRImiNAL LAW 96 (1933).
68. See note 10 supra.
69. Act of 1952, § 241(a)(3)-(4), 66 Stat. 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (3)-(4) (1952).
